Thought I would share some photos from the recent 150th Resaca reenactment in which the museum's living history detachment took part. The images of us laying in the mud represent THE magic moment of the Resaca event... where we are laying prone in the mud, firing as desperately as we can at three Federal field pieces a mere 100 yards off, who are firing canister at us. The rear rank loaded the muskets and passed them to the front rank which capped and fired. Sergeants Larsen and Lopez crawled through the mud back and forth behind the line to assist with muskets that fouled and to pull ammo up to the top of cartridge boxes. You can see how thick the battle smoke already was and sense the desperation of the moment, which trust me, felt even more desperate than the photo conveys. We lay here for 10 minutes or so, before being ordered to rise up an attack an enemy earthwork to our right, which we briefly overran. This action speaks to the quality of the men of the 4th, 9th and 6th Texas in the Red River Battalion. Most reenactors would never go prone on a dry battlefield, let alone a muddy one, and fire from that position. We did it because that was tactically the right thing to do, the realistic thing to do. Our troops embraced the moment and the spirit of doing it right... which they always do, and that is why they were the very best men on the field. It was an honor to command such an outstanding body of soldiers, living historians and friends.
After Gettysburg Before Grant
Pondering The Bristoe Station and Mine Run Campaigns and the War Between the States in general.
Thursday, June 12, 2014
Tuesday, May 13, 2014
Today is the 149th Anniversary of the Battle of Palmetto Ranch, the last land battle of the War Between the States. Fought just east of Brownsville, Texas on May 12-13, 1865. Despite many post war myths, the Texas forces were well aware of Lee's surrender, Johnston's imminent surrender and Lincoln's assassination. The South won this last battle. To learn more about it, be sure to read my book: The Last Battle of the Civil War: Palmetto Ranch. It is available on Amazon http://aftergettysburgbeforegrant.blogspot.com/
Latest News on Publication of my Book.
Heard from Ted Savas and Savas & Beatie yesterday. They will be putting out After Gettysburg, Before Grant. It was hoped publication might be late this fall, but it looks like that will slip into next spring. The hard work of editing, etc. will begin this summer and I will keep everyone abreast of how that goes.
Heard from Ted Savas and Savas & Beatie yesterday. They will be putting out After Gettysburg, Before Grant. It was hoped publication might be late this fall, but it looks like that will slip into next spring. The hard work of editing, etc. will begin this summer and I will keep everyone abreast of how that goes.
Monday, March 31, 2014
A column of march from the 150th Anniversary reenactment of Pittsburg Landing (aka Shiloh). Marching was the most common experience of the soldier on campaign. Everyone might not get into a battle, but everyone marched. The realities of a march are best understood by reading a great deal of accounts by veterans of the War Between the States and then going out and doing it yourself. It is one of the real benefits of reenacting/living history that it brings a visceral sense of understanding to the words the actual participants wrote. You hear the sound of a moving column, the shuffling of feat, the rattle of cups against canteens, the shout of commands, the jingle of equipment, the snort of horses; You experience the frustrating start and stop nature of a large column on the move, the mud or the dust, the heat or the cold, the weariness and uncertainty. All of that brings you into communion with what the veterans remembered, what stuck in their brains as important enough to share later in life.
Friday, March 28, 2014
An Execution in the Army of the Potomac
The first few chapters of my forthcoming book, After Gettysburg, Before Grant, deals with the difficult circumstances the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia found themselves in following the great battle in Pennsylvania. The Union force was as badly hurt by its victory as the Rebel force was by its defeat -- a not uncommon occurrence during the War Between the States. Each faced a wave of desertions caused by a variety of factors such as heavy casualties and the loss of key leaders which disrupted discipline, morale and cohesion in even veteran units. War weariness and home sickness were, as always, a significant factor in inducing men to desert. For the Union, however, there was a new source of discontent: the bounty jumper.
One of the most intriguing things I uncovered in researching the war in Virginia between August and December, 1863, was the symmetry between the antagonists. To a remarkable degree, both Lee and Meade faced the same problems and dealt with them in the same way. When it came to stamping out the dangerous scourge of desertion, the execution of convicted offenders proved to be vital to reducing the levels to acceptable levels for each side.
Here is a passage from my book detailing the Army of the Potomac's efforts to fight desertion.
One of the most intriguing things I uncovered in researching the war in Virginia between August and December, 1863, was the symmetry between the antagonists. To a remarkable degree, both Lee and Meade faced the same problems and dealt with them in the same way. When it came to stamping out the dangerous scourge of desertion, the execution of convicted offenders proved to be vital to reducing the levels to acceptable levels for each side.
Here is a passage from my book detailing the Army of the Potomac's efforts to fight desertion.
"Shortly after the First Battle of
Bull Run, the Federal government's call for more troops produced hundreds of
regiments whose men enlisted for a term of two or three years. Now, with more than 24 months of those three
years almost gone, many regiments that answered the nation's call in 1861 were
ready to go home. As the men in these
outfits saw it, they had done their part and now it was someone else's turn.
The army
was going to lose a good number of its experienced soldiers if all of those
eligible went home when their enlistments expired in early 1864. This problem was accentuated by the fact that
men being drafted to replace these veterans were not turning out to be very
reliable soldiers; indeed, many of these replacements were not even making it
to the army at all.
At the heart of this difficulty was
Federal conscription law. When recruiting began to dry up after November, 1862,
the result of prolonged fighting and heavy casualties, the Federal government
resorted to the draft. The Enrollment
Act of 1863, provided for the
conscription of whatever number of troops state governments were not able to
supply through volunteering. It was hoped
the threat of being drafted, considered an ignoble way to enter the army, would
induce hesitant men to enlist. The
stratagem worked for a while. But the legislation
also allowed a man to avoid service by either paying a $300 commutation fee or
hiring a substitute to go in his place.
The hiring of a substitute permanently removed one's name from the draft
rolls. The commutation fee did not, and
it would have to be paid each time a man's name was drawn for the draft.
Needless to
say, the system caused problems. Many
thought it inconsistent with the ethic of a free nation to compel men to
military service. Others were outraged
by the reality that the wealthy could buy their way out of their duty, raising
the specter of "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight." Indeed, by the time the war ended, 86,724 men
had paid the commutation fee and avoided going into the service. That number represented more men than were in
the entire Army of the Potomac in August, 1863.
To the
soldiers in the field, already experiencing the rigors and dangers of war,
commutation was bad enough. But an even
more vile practice in their eyes was bounty jumping. As the conscription system was structured,
the federal government made periodic calls on the states to furnish more
men. Each state was given a quota of
troops to provide. The state governments
in turn issued quotas to their various counties, townships and municipalities. If a certain locality could not produce its
quota by voluntary enlistments, the balance would be made up by conscripting
enough men from that area to make up the shortfall.
The draft was generally unpopular
and politicians were eager to do anything that would prevent their voters from
being conscripted. One way for a
locality to avoid having any of its citizens drafted was to induce men from
elsewhere to enlist in its district. In
this way, those outside the community would provide officials with a way to
meet their quota and prevent locals from being compelled to serve.
The pool of men who might be
brought into the service this way was not altogether large. As a result, cash incentives were offered to
convince potential "volunteers" to sign up. The use of money to attract recruits soon
brought fierce competition among counties, towns and cities, creating a
financial contest to see which could offer the highest reward. These monetary inducements were called
bounties, and depending on where a man chose to join, he could collect a
payment from the federal, state and local government. A bounty could quickly add up to over $1000 –
a princely sum in 1863. These large
rewards convinced many to sign their name on the muster role.
The real problem was that bounties
were inducements to join the army, but not necessarily incentives to do any
fighting. There were plenty of unscrupulous characters willing to enlist, often
under an assumed name, collect their bounty and then desert at the first
possible moment. Once at a safe distance
they would repeat the process in a different location. Such men were known as bounty jumpers and
they deserted in large numbers, as did many drafted men who were unable to buy
a substitute or pay the commutation fee.
The effect of this was to produce
large numbers of men who were supposed to reinforce the army, but very few who
actually did so. The difficulties of the
draft were exacerbated by the ill-advised way the Union previously dispatched
reinforcements to the army. It was far
easier to raise new units than it was to enlist men as replacements for
existing commands. This also allowed
governors more political patronage by passing out officer's commissions in
newly created regiments and batteries.
Thus new men came to the army in new regiments and very few came to fill
the gaps of veteran units already in the field.
As a result, many of the finest
commands in the army were no more than mere shadows; some regiments numbered
what individual companies were to muster under the army's table of
organization. A full strength infantry
regiment contained 1,000 men. By 1863,
most could assemble less than 600 and many no more than two or three
hundred.
The 14th Connecticut was a prime
example. In August, 1863, its ranks
contained only 80 original members.
Losses in the regiment had been so high it was earmarked to receive a large
number of replacements, mostly drafted men and substitutes. The 14th sent an officer north to collect a
group of these replacements and escort them back to Virginia. Starting with 117 men, he managed to arrive
in camp with only 42. The others deserted
along the way; most of them disappearing in New York City. On August 10,
another collection of 143 replacements reached the 14th Connecticut's
encampment. Within six days, 54 of these
men deserted. On the eighteenth, the regiment reported that of the over 200
replacements sent, 134 had run away.
The
Connecticut experience was hardly unique. Major Henry Abbot complained that
conscripts for the 20th Massachusetts were "deserting terribly." Out of a pool of 200 draftees, 30 had already
deserted, while another 40 were in the hospital, "ill of diseases which
they had when they" joined the army. "This drafting business is,
everywhere throughout the army without an exception, so far as I can learn… a
most lamentable failure," Abbot wrote.
Although he believed conscripts were really just paid volunteers, he
felt the circumstances of their enlistment deprived them of the "pride,
self respect & honor" felt by "even the worst of the
volunteers" of 1861. To keep these
men from running away, it seemed Meade had one half of his army "guarding
the other half."
Most
veterans had little regard for draftees or substitutes. Major Henry Winkler
pronounced the opinion of many when he lamented that substitutes were
"uncouth, untrained, insubordinate, mutinous, [and] everything bad." One
captain referred to a group of 109 replacements received by the 118th
Pennsylvania as a "fearful lot of loafers, bummers and substitutes."
In an effort to mentally prepare them for the new career on which they were
embarking, he took pains to impress upon them that they were "now of no
earthly account but to carry a musket… obey orders literally, draw and eat the
rations issued, growl to no purpose, and, when it becomes necessary, stand up
and get shot." The officer feared turning these men into soldiers would be
a "task which will bother us very much," and take a considerable
amount of time.
Despite the initial
reservations of commanders and enlisted men alike, draftees who stayed with the
army generally went on to make good soldiers.
Henry Abbot found himself unexpectedly concluding the conscripts brought
into the 20th Massachusetts proved "better than the men that originally
made up" the regiment. Although six or seven had deserted, and despite the
fact drill instructors had "put the screws to them like the devil,"
the major thought they would become "excellent soldiers… in time."
If men who were drafted and did not
desert eventually proved good soldiers, men who came into the army as the
result of receiving a bounty invariably made bad ones, if they stayed around to
become soldiers at all. The desertion
problem they created, while not quite the same as the one Lee faced, was
equally serious. The ease with which
bounty jumpers got away was very damaging to the morale of the army. It also made clear how readily a melancholy
soldier, who believed he had already done his share, might go home.
As was the case with the Rebels,
the officers of the Army of the Potomac realized stern discipline was required
to stem the tide of deserters. The
methods the Union used to combat desertion were the same as those employed by
the Confederates. On March 10, 1863,
Lincoln issued a general amnesty promising no punishment for any man absent
without leave who returned to his unit by the beginning of April. But, like Jefferson Davis' amnesty, Lincoln's
appeal achieved only a modest success.
Army regulations in 1860 authorized
the payment of $30 "for the arrest and delivery of a deserter to an
officer of the army.” But for some reason the United States Congress lowered
the authorized payment to $5 in September 1861. This seriously reduced the
motivation, already slim, of anyone interested in capturing deserters. In July 1863, the reward was raised to $10,
and in September it went back to $30. But the desired results were still
lacking. The methods being used to combat desertion were so unsuccessful some
officers began to offer a thirty-day furlough to any soldier who would help
detect, stop or turn in a potential deserter.
Executing Deserters, Sept 1863 by Alfred Waud
As was the case with the Confederates,
the only measure truly effective in stopping desertions was executing those
convicted of the crime in front of their former units. The first execution that summer was of five
Pennsylvania substitutes who, having "deliberately deserted after being
regularly put into the service," were caught, tried, convicted and
sentenced to death. Before the
executions were carried out, the men appealed to Lincoln for mercy. The
president wrote Meade telling him these men made their request without giving
any grounds for it whatsoever. Since he
understood these "are very flagrant cases and that you deem their
punishment as being indispensable to the service," Lincoln told his
general that, unless he was mistaken in this understanding, he was to inform
the culprits their appeal was denied.
Meade responded to the president,
telling him the men in question were "substitute conscripts who enlisted
for the purpose of deserting after receiving the bounty, and being the first of
this class whose cases came before me, I believed that humanity, the safety of
this army, and the most vital interests of the country required their prompt
execution as an example, the publicity given to which might, and I trust in
God, will, deter others from imitating their bad conduct." The day after
Meade wrote Lincoln, all five deserters were shot to death by firing squad in
front of 25,000 men.
Like
their Confederate counterparts, the Northern troops required to witness
executions had mixed feelings about the affairs. Repulsed by the spectacle they
tended to have empathy for the "wretched, horrible predicament" of
the condemned. Nonetheless, most soldiers approved their fate.
Brutal and hard to watch though
they may have been, executions soon became an almost routine part of the army's
activities. Every corps was supplied
with a gallows and shooting ground for administering the fate of those
convicted and sentenced to death. The
executions were held every week and "scarcely a Friday passed … that some
wretched deserter did not suffer the death penalty in the Army of the
Potomac."
All of this received a great deal
of attention in the Northern newspapers.
Harper's Weekly published
illustrations showing a September execution alongside a grisly account of the
occasion and a lengthy editorial justifying the shooting of deserters, all
penned by famed war correspondent and artist Alfred Waud. "The crime of desertion has been one of
the greatest drawbacks to our army," Waud wrote. "If the men who have
deserted their flag had but been present, on more than one occasion defeat
would have been victory and victory the destruction of the enemy.” Asserting that desertion was the “greatest
crime of the solider,” Waud felt the
government had shied from the proper response for too long and was glad to
report reluctance to execute deserters was a thing of the past."
Friday, March 21, 2014
The Battle of Jeffersonton, Virginia Oct. 1863
From reading most accounts of the Bristoe Station Campaign, launched by Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia on October 8, 1863 one would get the impression that there was little combat between the rival armies, save for the action at Bristoe Station on October 14, that gave the campaign its name. Nothing could be further from the truth. As Lee's maneuvers forced George Meade's Army of the Potomac back from Culpeper Courthouse to within 25 miles of Washington, D.C., there was a great deal of fighting -- much of it intense and quite severe. One of the most interesting actions occurred on October 12, as the Rebels moved to outflank Meade and cross the upper Rappahannock River. The results were the battles of Jeffersonston and Sulphur Springs. Below is an account of the battle of Jeffersonton from my forthcoming book, After Gettysburg, Before Grant, which will be published by Savas & Beatie this fall.
The Battle of Jeffersonton
Along the Rappahannock ,
everything hinged on news from Meade's right flank, where Brigadier General
David Gregg's division covered the river’s upper fords. The focal point of concern was Sulphur Springs – sometimes known as White
Sulphur Springs – one of the most beautiful and renown spots in all Virginia . Home of a mineral
spring reputed to have curative powers it had long been a popular tourist
attraction. During the 1830s entrepreneurs
had built a spacious and magnificent four-story hotel there. Combined with rows of individual guest
cottages flanking well-manicured and elaborately landscaped lawns, the resort
was capable of accommodating 800 guests.
Such
splendor did not survive the war, however.
In August 1862, Union and Confederate forces engaged in a nasty little
fight for the bridge spanning the Rappahannock
at Sulphur Springs. Hit by shells from
both sides, the hotel caught fire and burned to the ground. Now all that
remained of its former glory were blackened granite walls, standing in stark
contrast to majestic trees and untended gardens.
Little
more than a year later Sulphur Springs was once again the potential center of a
bull’s-eye. Lee’s infantry was marching hard toward the upper Rappahannock;
Hill’s Corp’s aiming for Waterloo
Bridge , while Ewell’s was
wearing out shoe leather toward the springs. But before the Rebels could count
on crossing the river at either location they would have to push Union cavalry
out of their way.
George
Meade did not intend for the Confederates to have to push very hard. Gregg’s
instructions were quite clear. He was to
post a brigade on the Sperryville road, watch for any sign of the enemy
and send in frequent reports. Meade's chief-of-staff made certain the general
understood “it was information of Lee's movements solely” that was wanted. The Union cavalry was not to get caught up in
a battle. It was not charged with
slowing Lee down. Its’ entire mission was to discover Lee's whereabouts and get
that information to army headquarters “at the earliest possible moment.” 222
Gregg
assigned the task of watching the Sulphur Springs road to his 2nd Brigade which
happened to be commanded by his cousin, Colonel John Irvin Gregg, who in turn placed
Lieutenant Colonel Garrick Mallery’s 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry between
Rixeyville and Jeffersonton. The rest of
the brigade he stationed north of the Rappahannock ,
spread out to cover the various roads to Warrenton.
Mallery
threw his pickets well forward of Jeffersonton and waited for something to
happen. For an agonizingly long time
nothing did. Feeling something
more proactive could be done, General Gregg dispatched Colonel Charles Smith’s 1st
Maine Cavalry to scout the road to Sperryville, traveling through Amissville,
Gaines Crossroads and Little Washington on its way.
As the 13th Pennsylvania stood guard near Jeffersonton,
Smith’s cavalrymen rode off to the west.
Reaching its destination without encountering opposition of any kind,
the regiment about faced to return via the same route it had come. Between
Amissville and Gaine’s Crossroads, however, it unexpectedly found A.P. Hill’s
infantry clogging the roads. In one of
those bizarre occurrences so common in war, the 1st Maine had ridden right across the path of
the oncoming Confederate army without seeing a single enemy soldier.
Realizing he had found what he had
been sent to find, Colonel Smith also understood he was powerless to
communicate his vital discovery. Cut off completely, with Lee's entire host
seemingly between his regiment and the Army of the Potomac ,
Smith had only one escape route left open.
The Union troopers headed north and west, beginning a thirty-hour trek
that would lead them on a 90-mile march around Lee's flank and back to their
own lines. While the 1st Maine
thus managed to save itself, the vital information it possessed regarding Lee's
movements was heading away from, not toward, George Meade.
As the
Maine
cavalrymen stumbled into their awkward predicament, Gregg’s troopers watching the Rixeyville Road
were descending into a worse ordeal. Around daybreak, dismounted Rebel cavalry began
driving in the 13th Pennsylvania ’s
outposts and by 9 a.m. Union pickets had been pushed all the way back into
Jeffersonton.
The
Rebels had no idea how many Yankees were holding the town, but they knew the
surest way to find out was to poke the beehive and see what swarmed out. So as
their dismounted skirmishers continued advancing, Southern cavalry essayed a
mounted charge toward the village. Anticipating
such a threat, Colonel Mallery had kept a reserve force of about 100 men in the
saddle. As the Rebels came thundering
forward, the Pennsylvanians counter charged.
For a moment it looked like a classic cavalry mêlée was at hand. But
before the opposing forces made contact the Virginians abruptly reversed course,
leaving their Yankee counterparts with no one to fight.
Being
denied a chance to cross sabers with the Rebels quickly proved the least of
Mallery’s problems. Lured out into the open, the mounted Pennsylvanians now became
easy targets for Southern marksmen who had been clandestinely deployed to take
advantage of the opportunity. Rapidly turning about, the Yankee cavalrymen beat
a hasty retreat. No matter how fast they spurred their horses, however, they had
no hope of outrunning the hailstorm of enemy bullets which emptied many saddles
before the colonel’s troopers made it back into town. Those who survived were ordered to dismount
and fight on foot.
As the
struggle around the little village continued, Mallery sent word back to John
Gregg that Confederate cavalry was on the road between Rixeyville and Culpeper.
Then, with no instructions to resist the Rebel advance, he ordered the 13th to
abandon Jeffersonton and fall back toward the Rappahannock .
As of yet Mallery’s men had seen no
Rebel infantry. The presence of Southern
cavalry meant little and might amount to nothing more than a reconnaissance. Not willing to
concede ground south of the river to Stuart’s horsemen, General Gregg ordered his
2nd Brigade to reinforce the Pennsylvanians.
That task
fell to Major George Covode’s 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, which was just going
into camp between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton when the message to head south
arrived. Abandoning their bivouac, Covode’s men, accompanied personally by Colonel
Gregg, were soon crossing the Rappahannock to support their fellow Keystone State troopers. About 12:30 p.m., the
4th met up with the 13th about a half mile north of Jeffersonton. Gregg promptly directed the two regiments to
reoccupy the hamlet, which was easily done – the Rebel cavalry meekly falling
back into woods south of town.
But the
enemy did not remain meek for long. Confederates in force made contact with the
Pennsylvanians around three in the afternoon.
The 11th Virginia Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Dulany Ball, found the
Federals posted behind hills, fences and a stone wall surrounding the town’s Baptist
church. Dismounting his troopers, Ball tried
to dislodge the Yankees by a quick push.
The Rebels attacked with great vigor and fighting swirled around the town –
its epicenter the church’s stone wall, which was the scene of several bouts of
hand-to-hand combat.
Despite
the determination of Ball’s assault, a pair of Union regiments proved too much
for his Virginians and they were driven back with some loss. Once
more, however, Federal success was momentary.
Shortly after Ball’s repulse, Stuart, Ewell and Robert E. Lee arrived on
the scene, bringing with them the bulk of Funsten’s cavalry brigade and Major
General Robert Rodes’ division which was the vanguard of Ewell's corps. Seeing the retreat of the 11th Virginia , Lee – not
content to be a mere bystander – told Stuart to deploy his regiments and drive
the Yankees away.
While
Stuart moved to execute Lee's orders, Rodes deployed Brigadier General Cullen
Battle’s six Alabama
regiments and Major Eugene Blackford’s sharpshooters to surround the town. Battle dispatched
the 3rd, 6th and 12th Alabama on a sweep to
envelop Jeffersonton from the west, while the 5th and 26th Alabama moved to strike from the east. Blackford’s
command made a mile-wide circuit to get behind the town, his men being careful
to stay out of sight of the its defenders.
As the
infantry pressed forward, Stuart shook out Funsten’s Brigade, sending
the 7th Virginia Cavalry to the left, while posting the 12th Virginia Cavalry
to the right. The 11th Virginia , remounted, took position in the
center. The Federal troopers in Jeffersonton
were not blind to what was happening and a continuous and rapid skirmish fire
erupted between the rival lines.
Once the
Confederate regiments surged forward, however, the outcome of the fight was a
foregone conclusion. Outnumbered and
outflanked, those Pennsylvanians who could fell back. But most of the dismounted Federals
discovered their horses had disappeared – either captured or run off. With no officers in sight, some troopers held
a quick consultation and decided to retreat to a nearby ridge covered with
cord wood. Here each man hurriedly
stacked firewood to make an individual little fortress.
No sooner
were these makeshift fortifications erected, than Rebel cavalry came bearing
down on the ridge. After driving off
five separate charges, the isolated Pennsylvanians suddenly found themselves
confronting Southern infantry. Private
John Hollis watched aghast as “large square bodies” of gray troops approached,
battle flags fluttering in the breeze.
With a sinking feeling the private realized there was no escape.
Nonetheless, he was surprised at just how quickly the Federal position was
overrun; Rebel infantry with fixed bayonets easily rousting the Yankees out of
their wooden forts and marching them away as prisoners.
Gregg’s
mounted men seemed headed toward a similarly grim fate. About a half a mile north of Jeffersonton the
road to Sulphur Springs passed through an expansive pine thicket three-quarter
miles in length. In this dreadful tangle Funsten’s regiments slammed into the
retreating Federals, who turned to make another stand. For thirty minutes a
vicious close quarters struggle swayed back and forth, the Virginia
and Pennsylvania
regiments charging and counter charging in the difficult terrain. It was as mean
a fight as could be imagined; the dense pines trapping the gun smoke and
intensifying the “rattle of small arms,” shouts of command and “cries and oaths
of the combatants.” One Rebel called the struggle a “bloody and doubtful
contest” in which confusion reigned supreme.
Gradually
the Federals were pushed back by Confederate numbers and relentlessness. During the mêlée, Blackford’s sharpshooters
slipped between the Pennsylvanians and the river, threatening the Federal line
of retreat. Realizing they were in danger of being surrounded, the Northerners broke
and fled, running for the Rappahannock with
Stuart's men in hot pursuit. As they dashed toward the river, the
sharpshooters, positioned parallel to the road, poured a hot fire into the
Federal troopers, killing a dozen and capturing 20 others whose horses fell
victim to their fire.
With
Rebel cavalry bearing down on their rear and Blackford’s marksmen ripping into
their flank, the Pennsylvanians’ situation seemed to be worsening by the
moment. Without help both Union regiments were sure to be cut off and
destroyed. In an effort to stem the
crisis, Major Henry Avery’s 10th New York Cavalry was ordered across the river
to do what it could to protect the battered commands desperately trying to
reach the Rappahannock . Avery led his regiment to the south bank
and deployed a squadron of skirmishers on the slope of a long ridge running perpendicular
to the road and about a half mile from the river. The sudden appearance of the 10th New York diverted Confederate attention from
Jeffersonton’s fleeing defenders, thus saving what could be saved of the
regiment’s Pennsylvania
brethren.
That
success was a double-edged sword, however, as the Rebels now focused their
wrath on the Federal newcomers and the New Yorkers found themselves in exactly
the same sort of jeopardy the battered Pennsylvanians were escaping. Luckily
for Avery, his men were relatively fresh and his opponents somewhat
disorganized by their clash at Jeffersonton. Still, the 10th barely held on
long enough for the Pennsylvanians to get away. With his mission accomplished
and enemy troops pressing ever closer, the major was eager to extract his
regiment from its increasingly perilous position before it was too late. Although
the order to retreat was not long in coming, the 10th barely managed to get
back to the river, losing heavily in men and horses in the process.
As Avery
withdrew toward the Rappahannock , the first
part of the afternoon’s action came to an end. Gregg's cavalrymen had put up
quite a fight and the cost of their stubbornness was high. All three Federal
regiments were cut to pieces, losing collectively 17 known dead, 114
wounded and 432 captured or missing.
Sadly, these Federal losses served
little purpose. The mission of Gregg’s regiments was reconnaissance not combat. Caught up in what seemed a fairly routine
fight against Rebel cavalry, they were taken completely by surprise when Rodes’
infantry suddenly appeared. With no hope of significantly slowing Lee's main
body, the few regiments engaged at Jeffersonton wound up fighting for mere
survival. Their struggle, although a
brave one, was so utterly absorbing it unintentionally delayed transmission of the
critical intelligence on which Meade's entire army was waiting.
As soon as Federal officers in
Jeffersonton had spotted Rebels wearing knapsacks, a courier was dispatched to
Sulphur Springs with news that Confederate infantry was nearby. The assault of Stuart's cavalry followed so
closely on the arrival of Lee's infantry however, the courier had no chance to
get away. Blundering into the path of
the 12th Virginia Cavalry, he was taken prisoner after being severely wounded
and having his horse killed.
Hence, only when the battered
remnants of the 13th and 4th Pennsylvania
safely crossed the river, could evidence of Lee's infantry finally begin its
journey to an anxious Meade. Not until 4:50 p.m. did General Gregg hold in his
hand reports confirming Rebel foot soldiers were at Jeffersonton and marching
on Sulphur Springs. Gregg hastily scrawled
out a message to Meade saying that a large column of enemy infantry was “in
plain sight” and moving to cross the Rappahannock.
Buford's reconnaissance had informed Meade hours before that Lee was not at Culpeper. Now Gregg had evidence the Southerners were moving to turn the Federal flank. The Army of the Potomac was in the wrong place and it would have to reat quickly to escape the trap Lee was settting.
Buford's reconnaissance had informed Meade hours before that Lee was not at Culpeper. Now Gregg had evidence the Southerners were moving to turn the Federal flank. The Army of the Potomac was in the wrong place and it would have to reat quickly to escape the trap Lee was settting.
Thursday, March 20, 2014
This tintype was taken at the 150th Anniversary Reenactment of the Battle of Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh to you Yankees). It shows me with some of my dearest friends and comrades from a reenacting career dating back to 1983! Seated: Mike Moore (left) and Scott Swenson. Standing: Gill Eastland (left), me (center) and Bob Huey.
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